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Reviews of Books

in wartime are supposed to be more responsive than
others to the pressures of public opinion, an effect that
points sometimes toward escalation, sometimes toward
moderation and timidity. A large body of literature surrounds the question whether democracies are sufficiently peace-loving by nature to preclude their fighting
each other. This proposition holds considerable inspiration for U.S. statesmen, who have made the spread of
democracy a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for the
last century and more, though historians may be inclined to skepticism, if only because history has offered
relatively few opportunities for conflict between democratic states. Alexis de Tocqueville, contemplating the
military potential of the fledging American republic,
proposed that democratic armies were different because it was both hard to get them to start fighting and
hard to get them to stop.
Alexander B. Downes’s book is not a comprehensive
study of the subject announced in its title. It seeks instead to come to grips with a derivative problem arising
from the theoretical literature on “democratic peace”:
are democracies more or less inclined than other belligerents to kill civilians in war? In the end, the author
concludes that democracies are more inclined, but only
under conditions of strategic “desperation” or when
they seek to acquire enemy territory. Few are likely to
find this conclusion persuasive, less because anyone seriously doubts the capacity of democracies to wreak
havoc than because the book makes no meaningful effort to compare the warfare of democratic states with
that of other kinds.
The book also suffers from tone-deafness toward the
moral and cognitive complexities of killing in war.
Downes offers a reasonable definition of who counts as
a civilian—anyone not in uniform or directly involved
in the manufacture of munitions—although this definition is actually more stringent than that embodied in
international law, a subject he neglects. He considers
civilians to have been targeted if they were killed either
deliberately or though culpable carelessness. This criterion is also reasonable, though its application can
prove extraordinarily difficult in real life, as the case
studies that occupy the last two-thirds of the book inadvertently demonstrate. Of these, the most disconcerting is the account of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which
is “coded” as a war of territorial aggression by the Israelis.
The general question why so many noncombatants
die in war is nevertheless a good one. Modern governments are distinguished neither by their willingness to
inflict civilian casualties nor by their professed concern
to avoid doing so. War is a normative concept and has
always included ideas about protected categories of innocents whose lives should be spared. Yet part of the
promise of modernity was that such ideas would have
a better chance of being realized in practice: if only life
were organized in more rational and publically responsible ways, the world would become a more peaceful
place—a dream that has so far failed to come true.
Democracies have stood out more by virtue of their

willingness to embrace this promise than by their capacity to fulfill it. That capacity has been improving,
however, due in large part to changing perceptions of
who the enemy is. For at least a century prior to the end
of the Cold War, belligerent governments, democratic
or not, tended to view their adversaries as integral
wholes, nations-in-arms against which any form of violence was justified if it threw sand in the gears of the
enemy’s war machine. Nowadays the United States, at
least, scarcely views its enemies as social entities at all,
but prefers to regard them as “regimes” that have effectively taken their own populations hostage, and
which should be fought by methods designed to sever
the supposedly fragile threads that connect state and
society. This is an idea worth contemplating, not least
because it may be wrong. Opponents of democracies
should not count on a reluctance to use force on the
part of democratic states. It would be no less wrong for
the democratic world to imagine that its opponents are
little more than deracinated criminal gangs, whose toppling can be accomplished by the kind of highly discriminating violence on which democracies pride themselves, but which, as Downes shows, they are perfectly
able to set aside when the chips are down.
DANIEL MORAN
Naval Postgraduate School
LORENZ M. LÜTHI. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the
Communist World. (Princeton Studies in International
History and Politics.) Princeton: Princeton University
Press. 2008. Pp. xvii, 375. Cloth $65.00, paper $27.95.
A reader of both Russian and Chinese, Lorenz M. Lüthi
provides fascinating depth and detail to an unstable
Sino-Soviet alliance shaped by strong and ambitious
personalities, nationalist sensitivities, cultural misunderstandings, and the perhaps inevitable clash between
two societies at very different stages in “socialist” history. China and the Soviet Union were headed in different directions, with Nikita Khrushchev committed to
de-Stalinization and further engagement with the
United States while Mao Zedong was pushing for
“more political and economic development along Revolutionary Stalinist lines” (p. 47). Lüthi returns often to
the problem of the ideological nature of the Sino-Soviet
dispute (evident in the two contrasting models of socialist development), the Stalin question, and imperialism and the Americans (pp. 8–12, 345). Along the
way, he carefully describes the central intersecting moments of Soviet and Chinese political history, from
Mao’s travails in Moscow in December 1949 to the denunciation of Marshal Peng Dehuai at the Lüshan Plenums in 1959 for his supposed sympathy for the Soviet
Union (pp. 31–36, 123–135). Lüthi continues the story
through the abrupt Soviet withdrawal of its advisers
from China in July 1960 to the early stages of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. A chorus of Chinese historians and memoir writers continue to blame the Soviet
withdrawal for decades of China’s economic difficul-
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Comparative/World
ties, while Russian scholars and memoir writers generally remain disturbed by what they consider the callous Chinese misuse of their “selfless” political and
economic aid. Lüthi considers the sudden withdrawal
something of a Soviet tactical blunder, as it gave the
Chinese a “convenient pretext . . . to deflect blame for
the self-induced economic collapse” (p. 176).
Lüthi’s greater familiarity with the Chinese materials
allows him to describe best the importance of the Soviet
factor in the disturbing evolution of Chinese politics on
the eve of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese memoir
writers are keen to address high-level episodes of diplomatic exchange and personality conflict, and their
new insights into the character of Mao are understandably intriguing to scholars of revolutionary China. For
Lüthi as well, Mao’s role was central to the ill-fated relationship. The author reasonably turns our attention to
the importance of Mao’s destructive radicalism and delusional perception of China’s future strength and role
in international affairs. Like other scholars of China,
such as Thomas J. Christensen, Roderick MacFarquhar, and Chen Jian, Lüthi emphasizes the close relationship between Mao’s efforts to mobilize the population and developments in Chinese foreign policy.
Liu Shaoqi, of course, eventually was denounced as
“China’s Khrushchev.” China scholars will be intrigued
by Lüthi’s research in the increasingly inaccessible foreign policy archive in Moscow, which greatly enhances
the narrative of Chinese politics on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. Figures such as Kang Sheng, Chen
Boda, and others central to the early unfolding of the
Cultural Revolution were closely engaged with the
problem of Soviet “revisionism” (p. 237).
Might scholars of Soviet history similarly pay more
attention to China? The Soviets and the Chinese were
in an intense debate about the stages of socialist development and the time frame for the glorious transition to “communism.” The Soviet notion of “catch up
and surpass” (dognat’ i peregnat’) that was directed at
the United States, the ideological pronouncements unveiled at party congresses, the continuing Stalin problem, and Soviet foreign policy generally always unfolded with China and the “Great Friendship” either
front and center or at least in the background. The process of “re-Stalinization” in the Soviet 1960s was implemented by figures such as Yuri Andropov, Mikhail
Suslov, and others who were still bruised by the split
and keenly aware of the impact of reform upon the
broader bloc.
Lüthi’s single-minded focus on the highest levels of
foreign policy exchange in the socialist bloc prevents
him from considering other kinds of archival materials
that might complicate his conclusions about the importance of ideology in the socialist world. What was the
relationship between the diverse practices and arrangements of the “friendship” and the angry and even bizarre exchanges between important figures such as Suslov, Andropov, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun? The
“friendship” of the 1950s meant the initiation of a vast
series of exchanges and collaborative relationships be-
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tween universities, cultural institutions, metallurgical
factories, and newspapers that were often about far
more than the charged ideological issues that divided
the important leaders at the apex of their hierarchical
political systems. The Soviet administrative system was
frequently exploitative, at home and in the far reaches
of the bloc, and incapable of responding to the diverse
concerns that made up what the Chinese called “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Socialist bloc practices deserve as much attention as socialist theory.
Lüthi offers new insight into numerous foreign policy
relationships central to the Cold War, while also directing our attention to a series of still unexplored issues
pertinent to the vast socialist bloc and the fascinating
alliance between the Russians and the Chinese.
AUSTIN JERSILD
Old Dominion University
ROBERT H. KARGON and ARTHUR P. MOLELLA. Invented
Edens: Techno-Cities of the Twentieth Century. (Lemelson Center Studies in Invention and Innovation.) Cambridge: MIT Press. 2008. Pp. viii, 190. $24.95.
Robert H. Kargon and Arthur P. Molella’s study traces
the work of thinkers and builders who tried to harness
technology to construct better, more livable cities and
towns. They do not aim at a strict intellectual history of
these ideas or an architectural history of projects built.
Instead, their goal is to explore how these ideas are developed in the real world and how the act of trying to
bring a utopian idea to life complicates this process.
Kargon and Molella focus on thinkers, scholarly and
otherwise, who proposed a planned society that would
make the most of both the rural and urban and created
a new technological hybrid: the garden city. Beginning
in England with the Garden City movement, then moving both to the United States and to Italy, the book
traces the ways politicians, architects, and others sought
to create a utopian vision of housing, technology, and
everyday life.
The book presents a series of case studies of what
would seem today to be “New Urbanism” city design.
All of the communities profiled are small (under
100,000 people) and designed with a mix of technologically based industry, parks and public spaces, and housing in belts around the central business area.
Each of the studies has enough depth to satisfy specialists in the field but not too much to slow the narrative or cloud the analysis. Kargon and Molella are
also astute in their discussions of the ways that abstract
ideas change when they are applied to real communities. They devote an early chapter to Torviscosa, a
model city designed by industrialists in Italy and built
by the fascist government that ultimately became a
“pleasant industrial town,” not a utopian model of industry and agriculture (p. 66).
The same dynamics can be seen at work in Oak
Ridge, a city in Tennessee created to house the vast
workforce brought to the area to work on the Manhat-
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